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LANGUAGE AND THE LAW
BERNHARD GROSSFELD*
INTRODUCTION
LANGUAGE HAS ONLY recently become a factor of
major interest in comparative law.' This is astonishing
in view of the fact that knowledge of a foreign language is
a prerequisite for most comparative law and that the lan-
guage is the jurist's most important instrument. But the
subject "language" has even wider implications and leads
us to ask whether, and to what extent, a particular lan-
guage may exert influence on a particular law. This ques-
tion has recently been discussed with regard to changes in
legal systems of developing countries, formerly a part of
the British Empire, when, upon gaining independence,
the native language replaced the English language.2 In
addition, some European authors have researched the re-
lation between language and law in more general ways.3
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Comparative Law, University of Muenster. Doktor der Rechte 1960, University of
Muenster; LL. M. 1963, Yale University: Habilitation 1966, University of Tub-
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See generally Hiller, Language, Law, Sports and Culture: The Transferability or Non-
Transferability of Words, Lifestyles, and Attitudes Through Law, 12 VAL. U.L. REV. 433
(1978).
2 See Marasinghe, Some Problems Associated with a Language Switch-Over in the Third
World, 10 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN UBERSEE 507 (1977).
3 See E. FORSTHOFF, RECHT UND SPRACHE (1940); H. NEUMANN-DUESBERG,
SPRACHE iM RECHT (1949). See also K. ZWEIGERT, Einige Uberlegungen zu Recht und
Sprache, in FESTCHRIFT FUR R. SCHMIDT (1976); VAN DEN BERGH/BROEKMAN,
RECHT EN TAAL (1978).
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A further investigation conveniently starts with the ob-
servation of Roscoe Pound, following Kantorowicz, who
called jurisprudence a "Wortwissenschaft," meaning a sci-
ence of words.4 What could he have meant by this? We
come close to an answer when we consider how important
rhythm,5 rhyme,6 and verses were for the old European
laws. 7 Another clue is provided when we consider the im-
portance of technical legal language in evaluating the re-
ception of foreign laws. Maitland provides a good
example of this by referring to the "law French" in Eng-
land, the language used by courts and lawyers in the Mid-
dle Ages.8 The "English law was tough and impervious to
foreign influence because it was highly technical, and it
was highly technical because English lawyers had been
able to make a vocabulary to define their concepts, to
think sharply as the man of science thinks." 9
We should also consider the close relations between
rhetoric and law in the beginning of the modern Euro-
pean legal culture.' 0 Two books, one by James B. White,
The Legal Imagination,"I and one by William R. Bishin and
Christopher D. Stone, Law, Language and Ethics,12 lead us
in a similar direction. This brings us to the central prob-
lem: What is the influence of language on law? Is the
structure of the law a function of the structure of our lan-
guage? Or, more precisely, does a particular language
create a particular law?
4 POUND, Some Thoughts About Comparative Law, in: FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST RABEL
7 (H. D611e ed. 1954).
Liebs, Rhytmische Rechtssdtze, 36 JURISTENZEITUNG 160 (1981).
G. DILCHER, PAARFORMELN IN DER RECHTSSPRACHE DES FRUHEN MITrELALTERS
(1961).
7 Freiherr von Kunssberg, RECHTSVERSE, NEUE HEIDELBERGER JAHRBUCHER 89
(1933).
8 MAITLAND, 17 SELDEN SOCIETY REPRINTS XXXVi (1903), reprinted in J. WHITE,
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 6 (1973).
9 Id.
10 OTrE, DIALOG UND JURISPRUDENZ (1971); GROESCHNER, DIALOGIK UND JURIS-
PRUDENZ (1982).
1' See supra note 8.
" See supra note 8; see also W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS
(1972).
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LANGUAGE AS A CREATIVE FORCE
In order to tackle these provocative questions, let us
first consider the status of language in human thinking in
general. This evaluation takes us back as far as Adam and
Eve. The Bible tells us that in the beginning "Adam gave
names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every
beast of the field."' 3 Thus, man recognizes the world
around him through the medium of language, and lan-
guage enables him to grasp and to define reality. Through
language he attains power. The Bible makes similar state-
ments with regard to God, albeit in reverse direction:
God cannot be named, cannot be grasped, cannot be
subordinated. 14 We find similar ideas in the ninth song of
the Odyssey. When the Cyclops, the "cruel and tempes-
tuous one," asked Odysseus his name, Odysseus an-
swered, "Nobody is my name; everybody calls me
Nobody." The same theme can be heard in Richard Wag-
ner's "Lohengrin:"' 5
Nie sollst Du nich befragen,
Noch wissend Sorge tragen,
Woher ich kam der Fahet;
Noch wie mein Nam' und Art.
We may add the beginning of St. John's gospel: "In the
beginning was the Word."' 16 Also remember that in all
religious mythologies the "word" has the highest position
in the order of creation.' 7 This gives us a feeling for the
power of language.
We find many other examples to illustrate the power of
language in the Bible. According to the Bible, creation of
the world was performed by the spoken word of God.
"And God said, let there be light."' 8 Then God said, "let
13 Genesis 2:20.
14 Genesis 32:30; Exodus 3:14.
15 Parzival, 11-16-825-18, reprinted in B. GROSSFELD, MACHT UND OHNMACHT DER
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 157, n. 34 (1984).
16 John 1:1. See also DURR, DIE WERTUNG DES GOTTLICHEN WORTES IM ALTEN TES-
TAMENT UND IM ANTIKEN ORIENT (1938).
17 CASSIRER, SPRACHE UND MYTHOS 44 (1946).
is Genesis 1:3.
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there be a firmament in the midst of the waters.' 9 God
had to speak the "fiat." It fits into this context that the
"creator spiritus," the Holy Spirit, on Pentecost revealed
himself in the "miracle of language ' 20 and that all Chris-
tian churches of Lutheran denomination regard them-
selves as founded on the "word" of the Scriptures.
Considering this, it is no longer astonishing that while
the expression "verb" literally means "word," it stands
for activity. It also fits into this line of thought that the
Greek expression "poet" stands for "creator." All this
links beautifully with what the linguists tell us about crea-
tivity as the core of language: Even the very young child
is able to form and understand sentences which he has
never heard before. We are able to build and compre-
hend a practically unlimited number of sentences. 21
THE MYTHS OF THE NAME
As already indicated, the power of language is most
closely associated with the use of names. To call someone
by his name makes him or her present. Let us begin again
with the Bible: "I have called you by your name - you are
mine!"'22 Catholics make the sign of the cross saying, "In
the name of the Father," and Christ himself admonished
his apostles "[f]or wherever two or three of you come to-
gether in my name, I will be present among them."' 23 The
name creates the actual existence, the name is the person
himself.24
19 Genesis 1:6.
2o Acts chs. 2, 3 & 4.
2 N. CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND (1962), reviewed by Skinner, 35 Language 26
(1965). For a survey, see generally J. LYONS, NOAM CHOMSKY (1970).
22 Isaiah 43:1.
23 Matthew 18:20.
' G. DILCHER, supra note 6, at 30. This concept is also revealed in the poem:
Everyone has a Name
Everyone has a name
given to him by God
and given to him by his
parents ....
Zelda, [an Israeli poet] (M. Falk trans.), reprinted in BERGMAN & Jucovy, GENERA-
TION OF THE HOLOCAUST 316 (1982).
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We find many other hints of this in religious ceremo-
nies. The words used for transubstantiation in the Catho-
lic mass ("hoc est corpus meus") even became the magic word
"hokus pokus".2 5 Other examples can be found in day to
day language. For example, "nameless fear" is a fear be-
yond our control. We say, "don't talk about it" "don't
touch it," etc.
Language is not only a means to comprehend the
world: it is even a means to recognize it. It is a mental
device to enable the mind to comprehend what it sees.26
This brings us back to the Bible again where the first di-
vine word created light ('fiat lux"). 27 Language enables us
to see the world.
LAW AS A PRODUCT OF LANGUAGE
The creative and comprehending power of language is
of special importance for the law. There is practically no
existence of legal notions outside language. One com-
mentator has stated that, "It is on the loom of language
that all law is spun."' 28 At least the positive law is bound
to language because its legal notions exist only in lan-
guage and through language. 29 Law is expressed in a
"verdict" ("verum dicere") and is connected with "jurisdic-
tion." Nevertheless, one should not go so far as to con-
clude that there is no law outside language. The
existence of customary law contradicts such a statement.
Customary law is often not expressed in words, but ex-
presses itself in particular situations. 30
The intimate connection between law and language is
confirmed when looking into the etymological roots of
25 H. NEUMANN-DUESBERG, supra note 3, at 24.
26 Goble, Nature, Man, and Law, in LANDMARKS OF LAw 24, 36 (R. Henson ed.
1960).
27 Genesis 1:3.
28 C.G. WEEREMANTRY, THE LAW IN CRISIS 133 (1975).
29 H. NEUMANN-DUESBERG, supra note 3, at 27.
30 L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 44 (1968).
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both expressions.3 1 A first impression is derived from the
fact that the Latin word "lex" means "law," but in the
combination "lexicon" it has the meaning "word." Now let
us compare "lex" and its genitive "legis" or its nominative
plural "leges" with the Greek word "logos," which stands
for "word" but also, as in logic, for "idea. ' 32 Indeed, the
common word is "legein," which means among others, "to
speak."'33 When we put the words "lex," "logos," and
"legein" together, we realize immediately how law, lan-
guage, and thought interrelate. Finally, the word "right"
shows the same characteristics when compared with the
German word "Rede" (speech) and the old English word
"wright" which means "constructive workman. 31 4
These common roots can probably be explained by the
fact that in prehistoric times the development of language
was a condition for the development of norms 5.3  There-
fore, it can be argued that positive law is nothing more
than an idea created and expressed through language.
LANGUAGE AND MIND
Having seen the importance of language to human
thinking in general and to the law in particular, we now
have a firm basis for approaching the question of whether
a particular language determines the structure of a partic-
ular law. Here again, we will first discuss in general terms
the impact of language on our thoughts. 6 An affirmative
31 A few hints can be found in WENGER, Sprachforschung und Rechtswissenschaft, in
1 WORTER UND SACHEN 84 (ed. 1909).
32 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 404 (ed. 1909).
3s Id. at 113, 233.
34 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 369 (ed. 1928). See also B. Grossfeld, supra
note 15, at 166.
55 Dux, Der Ursprung der Normen, 66 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS- UND SOZIAL-
PHILOSOPHIE 53 (1980).
36 J. BURCKHARD, UBER DES STUDIUM DER GESCHICHTE 276, n.3 (Ganz ed. 1982).
Burckhardt refers to the Roman writer Aulus Gellius (2d century A.D.) from
whom the sentence originates: "Quintus Eumius [Roman poet, 239-169 B.C.] tria
corda habere sese dicebat, quod loqui Graece et Osce et Latine sciset." Id. at 494;
SNELL, DIE ENTDECKUNG DES GEISTES 218 (4th ed. 1975). See also H. VON KLEIST,
Uber die allmdhliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Sprechen, in 2 SAMTLICHE WERKE
UND BRIEFE 319 (6th ed. 1977); B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRIT-
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answer to our question was first given in the eighteenth
century by the German philosopher and poet Johann
Gottfried Herder in his book Abhandlung iiber den Ursprung
der Sprache [Discussion on the Origins of Language], 7 and
again in the nineteenth century by Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt in his book Uber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen
Sprachbaus und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des
Menschengeschlechts [On the Differences of Human Lan-
guages and their Influence on the Intellectual Develop-
ment of the Human Race]. 8 In von Humboldt's eyes
language is a means not only to describe reality, but also
to discover reality. The differences in languages indicate
a different "Weltansicht" (view of the world). Language
draws our thoughts into particular patterns. 9
Following Edward Sapir,40 Lee Whorf, in what has been
termed the "Whorfian Hypothesis," stressed the impor-
tance of language structure in relation to the structure of
our thoughts. 4 1 He noted the linguistic background of all
human thinking.42 Every language constitutes a kind of
logic - an expression in which law, language, and thought
come together - that has a strong, although not inevitably
determinative, influence on our thoughts.43 According to
Whorf, human thinking is largely directed by unconscious
language mechanisms, "[a]nd every language is a vast pat-
tern-system, different from others, in which are culturally
INGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozO 339,340 (1947); E. FORSTHOFF, supra note 3,
at 9.
37 J.G. HERDER, ABHANDLUNG UBER DEN URSPRUNG DER SPRACHE (1772).
18 W. VON HUMBOLDT, UDBER DIE VERSCHIEDENHEIT DES MENSCHLICHEN
SPRACHBAUS UND IHREN EINFLUSS AUF DIE GEISTIGE ENTWICKLUNG DES MEN-
SCHENGESCHLECHTS (1836).
-9 H. NEUMANN-DUESBERG, supra note 3, at 69; WEZEL, SPRACHE UND GEIST IV
(1935); WEISGERBER, 1 VON DEN KRAFTEN DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE, 2 GRUNDZOGE
DER INHALTSBEZOGENEN GRAMMATIK, DIE SPRACHLICHE GESTALTUNG DER WELT,
(3d ed. 1962); SAUSSURE, COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GENERALE (1916).
4o E. SAPIR, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD
SAPIR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY (1949).
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ordained the forms and categories by which the personal-
ity not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, no-
tices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena,
channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his
consciousness." 44
Examples
The influence of a particular language on a particular
law can readily be discovered by comparing German and
English law. German law uses inflected words with the
consequence that in many cases the ending of the preced-
ing word relates to the following word, defining it in ad-
vance. Another characteristic of the German language is
that the past participle stands at the end of the sentence,
as does the verb in subordinate sentences. These features
require advance planning, and most sentences are con-
structed in such a way that the listener is able to discover
early the meaning of the words in the latter part of the
sentence. The German language, therefore, is a constant
training in linguistic constructions. It is a small wonder
that German law is more "constructed" and "technical"
than the Anglo-American law.
Following this discussion, it is not astonishing that the
Japanese Noda, in his book Introduction to Japanese Law ,4 5
discusses the structure of the Japanese language as a way
to explain Japanese law. He makes the point that the Jap-
anese language is not particularly well suited to express
logical relations and that this colors the Japanese law.46
Other authors say more bluntly that "[1]ogic has no place
in Japanese thought. 47
44 Id.
45 Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAw 9-13 (1976). See also Angelo, Think-
ing ofJapanese Law: A Linguistic Primer, 12 COMP. & INT'L L.J. OF S. AFR. 83 (1979).
46 Y. NODA, supra note 45, at 12.
47 Kim & Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of
Law, 28 Ir'L & CoMP. L.Q. 491, 496 (1979).
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CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPARATIVE LAW
These results are alarming to the comparative lawyer.
What happens to law that exists through and in language
if it is transferred into a different language? If the struc-
ture of a particular language plays an important role in
defining our thinking, it may well be that a particular lan-
guage can only express certain legal ideas and that the
limits of our particular language are the limits of our legal
reasoning.48 There is at least a suspicion that certain ba-
sic legal rules undergo a change when they are transferred
into another language. The farther apart the language
structures are from one another, the greater might be the
change in the law. This results from the fact that when alegal rule is implanted into a different language context,
the linguistic dynamics of the language might drive it in
an unexpected direction.4 9
So far, we do not know exactly how strong the influ-
ences of language are on the law.50 Language certainly
cannot explain the whole of the law, as the dimensions of
law exceed any single explanation and any single cause.5'
Language is only one factor among many, and all these
individual factors may well be weakened by the common
nature of all human beings.5 2 The "principle of relativ-
ity," therefore, makes comparative law more difficult, but
not impossible. 53 It is inevitable, however, that legal lin-
guistics be taken seriously by any comparative lawyer who
48 WITrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICOPHILOSOPHICUS, propositum 7 (1933).
49 According to Frege, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER ARITHMETIK 73 (1884), words
only have a meaning in the whole of a sentence. See also Bentham, Essay on Lan-
guage, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 10 (H. Hart ed. 1982); WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 48,
propositum 3.3 & 3.3.4. That principle may be transferred to the connection be-
tween legal notion and language.
5o For the range of the theory, see Henle, Language, Thought and Culture, in LAN-
GUAGE, THOUGHT AND CULTURE 1 (1958).
51 G6del, Uber formal unentscheidbare Sdtze der Principia Mathematica und Verwandle
Systeme, 1, 38 MONATSHEFT FUR MATHEMATIYK UND PHYSIK 173 (1931).
52 N. Chomsky, supra note 21.
53 GIPPER, GIBT ES EIN SPRACHLICHES RELATIVITATSPRINZIP? UNTERSUCHUNGEN
ZUR SAPIR-WHORF-HYPOTHESE 248 (1972); B. WEINSTEIN, THE Civic TONGUE -
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF LANGUAGE CHOICES 19 (1983).
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wishes to study more intensively the relation between lan-
guage and law.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE THEORY OF LAW
The relation between language and law is not only a
matter of concern for comparative lawyers; it is also of
great importance for all who wish to know more about the
functioning of law in general. This becomes apparent
when we consider Chomsky's theory concerning the deep
structure of human languages.54 According to Chomsky,
this deep structure of language is genetically transmitted;
it is "proto-human-grammar. ' ' 55 The question that imme-
diately follows is whether similar deep structures can be
found in law. This is indeed the idea of Perrott.5 6 He
suggests that there might be genetically transmitted legal
perceptions - "a natural law in DNA-Code. ' 57 "All posi-
tive legal systems may be merely surface manifestations of
a single deep structure to law, universal to all mankind,
knowledge of and facility with which is genetically trans-
mitted to all humans, and which imposes on us a range of
fundamental duties.15 8 We cannot elaborate on Perrott's
theory in detail or discuss all the pros and cons of the the-
ory; nevertheless, such an elaboration is not necessary. If
language has a genetic structure, the same is true for the
law, at least in part, because of the influence of language
on law. The genetic structure of a language is then trans-
ferred to law. This hypothesis might tell us something
about the force of law on human behavior and why law is
observed.
It is justifiable to assume that the language of the law
attempts to correspond to our internal structures. The
language aims to strike a chord in us. As the rhythm of
- N. Chomsky, supra note 21.
55 Id.
56 Perrott, Has Law a Deep Structure - The Origin of Fundamental Duties, in LASEK,
JAFFEY, PERROTr & SACHS, FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES 7 (1980).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 12.
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the music invites us to follow, as the sound of the drum
makes the soldier march, so the language of the law,
through its structure, its rhythm and its sound, stimulates
us to internalize the law. The language uses a genetic-
cultural sensibility for the purpose of the law. We follow
the law voluntarily as part of ourselves; the law is ob-
served not because we have to follow it but because we
want to.59 Instead of a "Sollensordnung" (external order)
it constitutes a "Wollensordhung" (internal order).
CONCLUSION
This brings us back to the initial considerations. We
understand why the old laws so often used rhyme and
rhythm: law that is only orally'transferred has to be and is
much more sensitive to language. In addition, the lesser
the power of authorities to enforce the law through exter-
nal controls, the greater the emphasis on internalization.
Law can only be effective if it is followed voluntarily, be-
cause of an internal stimulus.6 0 We all know similar mech-
anisms from church songs. Their first purpose is not the
confession of the creed, but rather they serve to internal-
ize the creed and to lead the singers in the direction of the
faith. The same is true with the law. A law that does not
correspond to the linguistic sensitivities of our society is
not regarded as "our law" but is seen as something for-
eign. Without a conducive language, positive law cannot
create legal mindedness (Rechtsgesinnung).6 1 It is here that
"language and law" become of central importance for
modern legal systems and for the functioning and survival
of legal cultures. The "magic" of language continues to
be a central pillar of law. It is a decisive factor in the legal
organizations of our Western societies.
59 See A. HAGERSTROM, INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS 136
(1953); concerning poetry Burckhard states, "Wenn sie mit ihm eine wundervolle
Sprache redet, wobei ihm zu Mute ist, als miisste dies einst in einem besseren
Dasein die seinige gewesen sein." J. BURCKHARD, supra note 36, at 386.
See G. DILCHER, supra note 6, at 32.
" BYDLINSKI, RECHTSGESINNUNG ALS AUFGABE, FESTSCHRIFT FUR KARL LARENZ
ZUM 80 GEBURTSTAG 1 (1983).
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